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The relationship between CEO pay and performance has been much analyzed in the 
management and economics literature. This study analyzes the structure of executive 
compensation in family and non-family firms. In line with predictions of agency theory, it is 
found that the share of base salary is higher with family-member CEOs than it is with non-
family member CEOs. Furthermore, family-member CEOs receive a lower share of option 
pay. The paper’s findings have implications for family business research and the executive 
compensation literature. To make the findings robust, the statistical analysis is performed with 
both Bayesian and classical frequentist methods. 
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The relationship between CEO pay and performance has been a central and recurrent issue in 
the management and economics literatures alike (e.g., Frey and Osterloh, 2005; Hall and 
Liebman, 1998; Jensen and Murphy, 1990a; Tosi et al., 2000). In 1990, Jensen and Murphy 
argued that executive pay is virtually independent of performance and that, on average, most 
CEOs are paid like bureaucrats (Jensen and Murphy, 1990b). With the strong increase of 
stock options in CEO pay over the last decades, however, the situation has changed: the link 
between executive pay and performance has become much stronger (Hall and Liebmann, 
1998; Hall, 2003). The discussion in the media and the academic literature has also turned and 
now concerns as well the adverse effects of an overly strong link between executive pay and 
firm performance (e.g., Frey and Osterloh, 2005; Useem, 2003; The Economist, 2006). The 
claim gets made that an overly strong link between executive pay and stock performance leads 
managers to focus too strongly on short-term profits at the expense of long-term opportunities 
(Fuller and Jensen, 2002) and that they neglect to pay dividends to the firm’s shareholders 
(Lambert, Lanen, and Larcker, 1989). So far, however, the discussion has largely ignored the 
fact that a sizeable number of publicly listed firms in the U.S. and other industrialized 
countries are family owned or family managed.
1 This paper aims to close this gap and 
analyzes the structure of executive pay in family firms, in particular its respective shares of 
base salary, annual bonus, long-term incentive plans, stock, and stock options. The main focus 
of this paper is on the role of incentive pay. From an agency theory perspective, it is unclear 
whether family firms have a higher or a lower share of incentive pay. 
  On the one hand, standard principal-agent theory predicts a low share of incentive pay. 
Family-managed firms often resemble owner-managed firms, in which an agency conflict 
between owners and management is unlikely to occur. Bonding mechanisms to solve such an 
                                                 
1   In the U.S., depending on the exact definition used, the share of family firms among the Fortune 500 firms 
ranges from 7 to 37% (Villalonga and Amit, 2006). For an international comparison on the importance of 
family firms, see La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999).   3
agency conflicts are, therefore, not necessary in the first place (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
2 
On the other hand, when executive pay in general and incentive pay in particular are regarded 
more as a potential source rather than a solution to an existing agency problem (Bebchuk and 
Fried, 2003), an alternative view is possible. Clever executives have the power to manipulate 
the remuneration process to benefit themselves at the expense of the company (Bebchuk, 
Fried, and Walker, 2002). In particular, stock-based pay is being criticized as being vulnerable 
to manipulation (Dechow, Hutton, and Sloan, 1996). Family executives are in a strong 
position to manipulate the remuneration process. Since they have known the business for a 
long time (they have often grown up with the business), they have a strong information 
advantage over non-family board directors. Furthermore, due to their relatively strong 
position in the firm (they are often important shareholders themselves), they have a strong 
influence on the composition of the remuneration board. Thus, a family CEO might use his or 
her firm as a vehicle to generate private benefits of control, which are to the detriment of the 
company and its less powerful shareholders (Claessens et al., 2002; Morck and Yeung, 2003). 
The findings of this paper support the argument that agency conflicts between owners 
and management are lower in family firms versus non-family firms. It is found that both 
family management and the degree of family ownership increase the share of base salary. In 
addition to this, a negative relationship between family management and the share of stock 
option pay is found. There seems to be a strong alignment of interests between a family CEO 
and the firm for which he or she works. An alternative interpretation is that family managers 
are intrinsically more strongly motivated to behave in the firm’s best interest. With its 
findings, the paper contributes to the discussion on the motivation of family CEOs to act in 
the interest of the firm (e.g., Corbetta and Salvato, 2004). The main contribution of this paper 
                                                 
2   Schulze et al. (2001) take a different view and argue that private ownership and owner-management do not 
eliminate the agency conflict but just create another type of agency conflict. In their view, family firms are 
exposed to a self-control problem caused by the altruism of family managers towards members of their own 
family. In such a situation, bonding mechanisms would then help to better align the interests of a family 
manager with the interests of the firm and its non-family shareholders.   4
is to show that family firm characteristics actually make a difference in regards to the 
structure of executive pay. Thus far, the discussion about the use and effectiveness of stock 
options has not taken into account family business variables (e.g., Dittmann and Maug, 2007). 
Finally, the paper also contributes to the discussion on using Bayesian methods in 
management research (e.g., Hahn and Doh, 2006). In contrast to other disciplines, 
management research rarely employs Bayesian methods. This paper shows that Bayesian 
methods can provide a useful robustness check. Unlike classical methods, the Bayesian 
approach does not rely on statistical tests and asymptotic theory. The results are, therefore, 
more robust when multicollinearity and other problems affecting the quality of statistical tests 
are present (Leamer, 1973), as they often are in management research. 
The remainder of the paper is constructed as follows. Section 2 derives hypotheses about 
the structure of executive pay in family firms. The next section then describes the data and 
introduces the methods used, in particular the Bayesian approach. Section 4 reports the results 
of the statistical analysis. Finally, Section 5 discusses implications of the findings from a 
research and management perspective and gives a brief conclusion. 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
One of the main goals of CEO pay is to align the interests of a CEO with the interests 
of a firm’s shareholders. A large theoretical literature has analyzed how a manager’s 
compensation contract should be designed to accomplish this goal. Most of these articles rely 
on some kind of principal-agent model to derive their conclusions. One of the important 
assumptions underlying most of these contributions is that the interests of the CEO and the 
interests of the shareholders of a firm differ to a substantial degree. To solve this problem, 
incentives should be given to align the interests of the two groups. Or, as Jensen and Murphy 
(1990b) put it, managers should be paid not like bureaucrats but like value-maximizing 
entrepreneurs. Generally, aside from problems related to performance measurement (Baker,   5
1992), cooperation and coordination (Gibbons, 1998) or multitasking (Holmstrom and 
Milgrom, 1991), the more the interests of the two groups differ, the larger the sensitivity of 
pay to performance should be. An interesting case emerges with family management, though. 
For many reasons, the situation of a manager with kinship ties to the business-owning family 
differs from that of a non-family manager. What are these differences, and how do they relate 
to the structure of executive pay? 
Family management and the structure of executive pay 
Family CEOs differ from other CEOs in a number of respects. First, for family CEOs, the 
firm is not just an employer that can be left easily. The firm symbolizes the heritage and 
tradition of their family and is likely to be part of their identity. That is why family CEOs are 
unlikely to act strongly against the interests of the firm; in the end, doing so would harm also 
themselves. This becomes even more evident when family CEOs bear the firm’s name; in 
such cases, their reputation in the public is linked to the well-being of the firm (Dyer and 
Whetten, 2006; Uhlaner, Goor-Balk, and Masurel, 2004; Wiklund, 2006). Besides this high 
value of integrity, strong feelings of identity lead family managers to seek self-actualization in 
terms of achieving firm goals rather than individual goals (Corbetta and Salvato, 2004; Davis, 
Schoorman, and Donaldson, 1997). Second, one of the main goals of family managers is to 
pass the firm on to the family’s next generation (Casson, 1999; James, 1999). To achieve this 
goal, they pursue long-term oriented business strategies such as investing in R&D (Block and 
Thams, 2007; Le Breton-Miller and Miller, 2006) or keeping good relations with the firm’s 
employees (Block, 2008), strategies that, in some cases, may not be well perceived by the 
stock market (because, for example, they might cut dividends to make necessary investments 
in R&D). Third, and linked to the first two aspects, is the fact that the goals of family 
managers are often non-financial by nature (Donckels and Frohlich, 1991; Harris and 
Martinez, 1994; Tagiuri and Davis, 1992). For example, it is difficult to express a goal such as   6
preserving the family’s craft and reputation in monetary terms. The same is true for the goal 
of transferring the firm to the next generation or the goal of independence. 
To summarize, the interests of a family CEO are often strongly aligned with the firm’s 
long-term interests. For the several reasons given above, family CEOs are intrinsically 
strongly motivated to act in the firm’s best interest. Giving high-powered incentives in such a 
situation may not be a good idea. Individuals might shift their locus from the activity itself to 
the reward or sanction; intrinsic motivation might be crowded out (Deci and Ryan, 2000; Frey 
and Osterloh, 2005). The importance of non-financial goals for non-family CEOs creates 
another problem. It is difficult to design a compensation contract contingent on non-financial 
goals since, in most cases, such goals are difficult to observe or measure (e.g., consider the 
goal of keeping good relations with employees or suppliers or the goal of independence). 
Based on these two arguments, the compensation contract of a non-family CEO should be 
low-powered (i.e., it should include only a low level of incentives). Accordingly, the 
following five hypotheses should hold: 
Hypothesis 1a. There is a positive relationship between the CEO being a member of 
the founding family and the share of base salary in total pay. 
Hypothesis 1b. There is a negative relationship between the CEO being a member of 
the founding family and the share of annual bonus in total pay. 
Hypothesis 1c. There is a negative relationship between the CEO being a member of 
the founding family and the share of payment due to long-term incentive plans in total 
pay. 
Hypothesis 1d. There is a negative relationship between the CEO being a member of 
the founding family and the share of stock pay in total pay. 
Hypothesis 1e. There is a negative relationship between the CEO being a member of 
the founding family and the share of stock option pay in total pay.   7
Family ownership and the structure of executive pay 
I expect the level of family ownership and the share of incentive pay to be negatively related 
for the following reasons. 
  Agency theory states that, in a situation in which the principal has information to 
verify the agent’s behavior, then the agent is more likely to behave in the interests of the 
principal (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Agency theory further states that, in 
a situation in which the principal has information about the behavior of the agent, an outcome-
based contract is suboptimal because it needlessly transfers risk to the agent (Eisenhardt, 
1989). Hence, in a situation of low information asymmetry between shareholders and 
management, the fixed component of pay should be high, and incentive pay should be low. 
Referring to the discussion of family versus non-family owners, one can argue that family 
owners know their firm and the underlying business model better than non-family owners do. 
In contrast to non-family owners, family owners have often grown up with the firm and know 
the business and its management team very well (Ward, 2004). The following five hypotheses 
should apply: 
Hypothesis 2a. There is a positive relationship between the extent of family ownership 
and the share of base salary in total pay. 
Hypothesis 2b. There is a negative relationship between the extent of family ownership 
and the share of annual bonus in total pay. 
Hypothesis 2c. There is a negative relationship between the extent of family ownership 
and the share of payment due to long-term incentive plans in total pay. 
Hypothesis 2d. There is a negative relationship between the extent of family ownership 
and the share of stock pay in total pay. 
Hypothesis 2e. There is a negative relationship between the extent of family ownership 
and the share of stock option pay in total pay.   8
DATA AND METHOD 
Sample Construction 
The Standard & Poor’s 500, as of July 31, 2003, was used as a starting point for constructing 
a sample of family and non-family firms.
3 Starting from this basis, more detailed data about 
the ownership structures and management compositions of the companies were collected from 
corporate proxy statements submitted to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for the 
years 1993-2002.
4  In the next step, information from Hoover’s Handbook of American 
Business, Gale Business Resources, the Twentieth Century American Business Leaders 
Database at Harvard Business School, Forbes’ Lists of 400 Richest Americans, Marquis 
Who’s Who in America, as well as the websites of the companies was used to check and 
expand the dataset. In a final step, the dataset was merged with Standard & Poor’s 
ExecuComp database, which provides annual data on executive pay. The final estimation 
sample covers 2,578 observations from 393 firms. 
Measures 
Dependent variables. This study analyzes the structure of executive pay and its 
relation to family management and the level of family ownership. Accordingly, the following 
measures were used as dependent variables: share of base salary, share of annual bonus, 
share of payment due to long-term incentive plans, share of stock payment, and share of stock 
option payment (all in percent of total pay). Table A1 gives more details about the 
ExecuComp data items that were used. 
Independent variables. To test the hypotheses, two variables with regard to family 
firms were constructed. The variable family CEO is an indicator variable that equals one if a 
member of the founding family is CEO and zero otherwise. The variable ownership by family 
                                                 
3   This particular date was chosen since an issue of BusinessWeek indicates the family firms in the S&P 500 at 
this date (BusinessWeek, 2003). This issue of the BusinessWeek provides helpful qualitative information 
about the ownership structure and the management composition of the family firms covered. 
4   The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires officers, directors, and five-percent owners to disclose their 
holdings. This information was collected from the definitive proxy statements (DEF 14A).   9
gives the percentage of stock owned by the founding family. To distinguish family ownership 
from other types of owners, two further ownership variables were constructed. The variable 
ownership by financial investors measures the percentage of stock owned by large banks (e.g., 
Citigroup or JP Morgan), insurance companies (e.g., The Prudential Insurance Company or 
AXA), mutual funds (e.g., Fidelity Investments or Putnam Investments), private equity firms 
(e.g., KKR or Permira) or large individual financial investors (e.g., Warren Buffet, Kirk 
Kirkorian, or Philipp Anschutz). The variable ownership by employees measures the 
percentage of stock owned by employees through various types of employee stock ownership 
plans (ESOP). To control for other firm-, industry-, and time-specific influences, many more 
variables were constructed and included in the regression models. Table A1 in the appendix 
provides more details. 
Method 
A random effects panel data model was used to test the hypotheses.
5 Somewhat unusually, 
this paper uses both a classical frequentist approach and a Bayesian approach to estimate the 
econometric models. As will become clear in the results section, the inclusion of the Bayesian 
approach makes the results more robust and provides some additional insights for theory. To 
familiarize the reader with Bayesian analysis, the approach is described below. 
  Bayesian analysis relies on Bayes’ theorem of probability (Bayes, 1763). This theorem 
is given by 
) Pr(






θ = ,       ( 1 )  
                                                 
5   A Breusch-Pagan Lagragian Multiplier Test (Breusch and Pagan, 1980) is used to determine whether a 
random effects model should be preferred to a pooled OLS model. Typically, in a next step, a Hausman 
specification test (Hausman, 1978) should be used to decide whether a random effects or a fixed effects 
model is more appropriate. However, since the variable family CEO is to a substantial degree time-invariant 
(in 61 of the 393 firms, a change happened), and since the industry variables are completely time-invariant, a 
fixed-effects model makes little sense. That is why a random effects model is used in this paper.   10
where θ  represents the set of unknown parameters and  y  represents the data.  ) Pr(θ is the 
prior distribution of the parameter θ , which may be derived from theory or other sources. 
) | Pr( θ y  is the likelihood function, which is the probability of the data y given the unknown 
parameter θ . Pr(y) is the marginal distribution of the data y, and, finally,  ) | Pr( y θ  represents 
the posterior distribution, which is the probability of the parameter θ  given the data y. To test 
theory, Bayesian analysis proceeds from here to the following three steps: first, a priori 
beliefs about the relationship of interest are formulated (the prior distribution,  ) Pr(θ ). Next, a 
probability of occurrence of the data given these a priori beliefs is assumed (the likelihood 
function,  ) | Pr( θ y ). In a final step, data are then used to update the a priori beliefs. The result 
is the posterior distribution,  ) | Pr( y θ , which is a probability density function of the unknown 
parameters. Unlike with the result of classical econometrics, the result of Bayesian analysis 
allows for statements in terms of likely and unlikely parameter values. This latter aspect 
results in a fundamental difference in regards to testing theory. In contrast to classical 
frequentist econometrics, Bayesian analysis does not rely on asymptotic theory and statistical 
tests to test a hypothesis. Rather, the result is simply a statement about whether a particular a 
priori defined relationship between two variables has become more likely or not given the 
data. The reason to use a Bayesian approach as an additional element in the statistical analysis 
of this paper is that the main variables of interest, family CEO and family ownership, are 
correlated to a substantial degree with each other as well as with some other independent 
variables (see Table A2 in the appendix), thus reducing the efficiency of the estimates given 
by classical econometrics. Generally, Bayesian analysis is more robust to problems of 
multicollinearity and other problems affecting the efficiency of the estimates since it does not 
rely on asymptotic theory and statistical tests to test theory (Leamer, 1973). For the Matlab 
code used to run the Bayesian regressions, please contact the author.   11
RESULTS 
Descriptive statistics and univariate analysis 
Table 1a gives some descriptive statistics about the level and structure of executive pay in our 
sample. A median CEO earns $4.4 million (mean: $8.2 million). Yet, with the lowest CEO 
pay at $0.001 million and the highest CEO pay at $293 million, the range of executive pay is 
large (the standard deviation is $15.52 million). Regarding the components of executive pay, 
the results are as follows: the median CEO base salary is $0.78 million (about 18% of total 
pay), his or her annual bonus is $0.66 million (about 17% of total pay), and his or her median 
stock option pay is $1.78 million (about 44% of total pay). Compared to the other components 
of executive pay, stock pay and pay due to long-term incentive plans seem to be of lesser 
importance. Most of the variance in executive pay seems to come from stock option pay 
(coefficient of variation is 2.74). Table 1b uses t-tests to compare the structure of executive 
pay in family versus non-family firms. In regard to family management, it is found that, on 
average, family CEOs have a higher share of base salary (28% vs. 22%, with p<0.001), a 
lower share of stock pay (4% vs. 7%, with p<0.001) and a lower share of pay due to long-term 
incentive plans (2% vs. 5%, with p<0.001). Regarding family ownership, it is found that, in 
firms where a family shareholder is present who has 5% or more of shares, CEOs have a 
higher share of base salary (30% vs. 22%, with p<0.001) and a higher share of annual bonus 
(21% vs. 19%, with p=0.003). Furthermore, it is found that CEOs in firms with a family 
shareholder have a lower share of pay due to long-term incentive plans (2% vs. 5%, with 
p<0.001), a lower share of stock pay (3% vs. 7%, with p<0.001) and a lower share of stock 
option pay (41% vs. 44%, with p=0.017). 
Multivariate analysis 
Table A2 in the appendix shows the correlation matrix and the corresponding variance 
inflation factors. Not surprisingly, the variables family CEO and ownership by family are   12
positively correlated (r=0.25). Furthermore, the variable family CEO is negatively correlated 
with the variable firm age (r=-0.3) and positively correlated with the variable CEO tenure 
(r=0.2). The variable ownership by family is negatively correlated with the variable ownership 
by financial investors (r=-0.24). Table 2 shows a random effects model on total pay. The 
coefficients of most covariates are as expected, e.g., firm size and a high market-to-book ratio 
increase CEO pay. With regard to the variables family CEO and ownership by family, an 
interesting difference emerges. The variable family CEO seems not to have an impact on total 
CEO pay (β=512.81 with p>0.1), whereas the variable ownership by family is found to have a 
negative impact on CEO pay (β=-58.21, with p<0.1). The impact of the latter effect, however, 
does not differ strongly from the effect of the variable ownership by financial investors (β=-
49.07, with p<0.05). Regarding the structure of executive pay, Table 3 displays random 
effects regressions on the share of the respective components in total pay. In addition to this, 
Table 4 shows the results of the same regression models estimated using a Bayesian method. 
  Base salary. Both in the Bayesian and in the classical regression model, the share of 
base salary in total pay is found to be about four percentage points higher with family CEOs 
than with non-family CEOs. The median coefficient of the variable family CEO in the 
Bayesian model is 3.88; the probability of a positive impact of the variable is 99%. With the 
variable ownership by family, the results differ to some degree between the Bayesian and the 
classical regression. In both models, the coefficient of the variable ownership by family is 
found to be positive, yet the size of the coefficient differs. Estimated with a classical method, 
the effect is found to be 0.24, with p<0.01
6; estimated with a Bayesian method, the median 
coefficient is found to be only 0.1. Nevertheless, despite the differences in the size of the 
coefficients, both the classical and the Bayesian model predict a positive relationship between 
family ownership and the share of base salary, thereby supporting hypothesis 1a and 2a. 
                                                 
6   That is, a 10% increase in family ownership increases the share of base salary by 2.4 percentage points.   13
 Annual  bonus. For the share of annual bonus in total pay, the results of the classical 
and the Bayesian model are found to differ. In the Bayesian model, the median coefficient of 
the variable family CEO is 2.1; the probability of a positive effect is 91%. In the classical 
model, the coefficient is 0.2, with p>0.1. With the variable ownership by family, the median 
coefficient in the Bayesian model is -0.03; the probability of a positive effect is 38%. 
Estimated in the classical way, the coefficient of the variable ownership by family is 0.07, 
with p>0.1. Hypothesis 1b and 2b are both not supported. 
 Long-term  incentive  plan.  With the share of payment due to long-term incentive 
plans, neither the classical nor the Bayesian model finds evidence for a strong effect of family 
management or degree of family ownership. In the classical model, the coefficients of both 
variables are statistically insignificant (p>0.1); in the Bayesian model, the probability of a 
positive effect is 50% for the variable family CEO and 30% for the variable ownership by 
family. Both hypothesis 1c and 2c are not supported. 
 Stock  pay.  With regard to the share of stock pay in total pay, the results of the classical 
and the Bayesian model go in the same direction. With both approaches, family management 
seems not to have a strong impact on the share of stock pay (classical regression: ß=-0.39, 
with p>0.1; Bayesian regression: median coefficient=0.88, with a 74% probability of a 
positive effect). Interestingly, however, both models predict a negative relationship between 
family ownership and the share of stock pay. In the classical regression, the coefficient of the 
variable  ownership by family is -0.07, with p<0.1. The Bayesian model yields a median 
coefficient of -0.08; the probability of a positive effect is 15%. Hypothesis 1d is not 
supported, whereas hypothesis 2d is supported.  
  Stock option pay. Regarding the share of stock option pay in total pay, the results of 
the classical and the Bayesian model are found to differ to some degree. Both models predict a 
negative relationship between family management and the share of stock option pay in total 
pay. In the classical model, the coefficient of the variable family CEO is -4.61, with p<0.1;   14
estimated with the Bayesian method, the median coefficient of the variable family CEO 
becomes -10.07, with a probability of a positive effect below 1%. Despite the differences in 
the size of the coefficient, both models predict a negative relationship between family 
management and share of stock option pay. With the variable ownership by family, however, 
the situation is different. The classical regression yields a coefficient of -0.24, with p<0.01; 
estimated using a Bayesian method, the coefficient is 0.01, with a probability of a positive 
effect of 52%. Hypothesis 1e is supported; hypothesis 2e not. 
Summarizing the results of the multivariate regressions, hypothesis 1a (positive 
relationship between family management and the share of base salary in total pay), hypothesis 
2a (positive relationship between family ownership and the share of base salary), hypothesis 
2d (negative relationship between family ownership and the share of stock pay), and 
hypothesis 1e (negative relationship between family management and the share of stock 
option pay) are strongly supported by the data. In all these cases, both the classical and the 
Bayesian regression model yield similar results. 
DISCUSSION 
Implications for practice 
From a practical perspective, this paper’s main contribution is to show that there exist great 
differences between family and non-family firms regarding the structure of executive pay. The 
share of stock-based pay in family firms is found to be lower, and the share of base salary is 
found to be higher than in comparable non-family firms. This is an important result for 
members of remuneration boards and executive pay consultants to consider. This paper’s 
interpretation is that intrinsic motivation plays an important role for family CEOs. 
Accordingly, offering family CEOs an overly high-powered compensation contract might not 
be a good idea since it is likely to crowd out (intrinsic) motivation.   15
Implications for theory 
Our findings have a number of important implications for family business research and the 
executive pay literature. 
  With regard to family business research, this paper contributes to the discussion of 
whether members of the founding family use their firm to extract private benefits of control 
(Claessens et al., 2002; Morck and Yeung, 2003). The results of this paper do not support this 
view. In line with prior studies (Gomez-Meija, Larraza-Kintana, and Makri, 2003; 
McConaughy, 2000), family CEOs are not found to have a higher salary than non-family 
CEOs. Moreover, after controlling for firm and industry characteristics, the share of stock 
option pay is lower for family than it is for non-family CEOs. This is an interesting result 
because executive pay scandals and their coverage in the media often have addressed the 
exorbitant value of stock option pay (e.g., The Economist, 2006; Useem, 2003). It should be 
noted, however, that it cannot be ruled out that members of the founding family seek private 
benefits of control. They might simply use means other than manipulating the remuneration 
process to extract personal rents.
7 In addition to this, this paper contributes to the 
understanding of the motivation of family CEOs to act in line with the firm’s interests. The 
finding that, relative to non-family CEOs, family CEOs receive a lower share of incentive-
based pay supports the idea that family CEOs are intrinsically more strongly motivated to act 
in line with the firm’s goals than are non-family CEOs. Thus, family managers can be seen as 
stewards who act in the best interests of their firm (Chrisman et al., 2007; Corbetta and 
Salvato, 2004). Still, the share of incentive-based pay is sizeable. Even with cautious 
estimates (i.e., not considering annual bonus), the average share of incentive pay is about 
50%. This finding supports the idea that a CEO’s altruism towards the members of his or her 
own family creates agency costs (Schulze et al., 2001; Schulze, Lubatkin, and Dino, 2003), 
                                                 
7   For a discussion of the various types of private benefits of control, see Dyck and Zingales (2004). For an 
example of an unusual and “creative” way to extract rents from shareholders, see Liu and Yermack (2007).   16
which can be reduced by bonding mechanisms. An alternative interpretation is that non-family 
shareholders such as mutual funds do not believe that family CEOs behave in the firm’s best 
interest and therefore prefer to tie executive pay to performance. 
  The main contribution of this paper to the executive compensation literature is to show 
that the structure of executive pay is different in family firms versus non-family firms, in 
particular the share of stock options and base salary. This result is important for the literature 
that analyzes the use and effectiveness of executive options (e.g., Dittmann and Maug, 2007; 
Feltham and Wu, 2001; for a summary, see Arnold and Gillenkirch, 2007). This paper argues 
that the great differences between family and non-family CEOs are attributable to the former’s 
stronger intrinsic motivation. An alternative explanation would be to see options as a form of 
hidden compensation that is not perceived by the market (Dechow et al., 1996), a view that 
then might lead to a principal-agent problem concerning the remuneration process (Bebchuk 
and Fried, 2003). Further research will have to decide which of the two explanations is better 
suited to explaining this paper’s findings regarding the lower share of stock-option pay in 
family-managed firms. In a similar vein, this paper contributes to the literature analyzing the 
pay-to-performance relationship (Jensen and Murphy, 1990a; 1990b; for a summary, see Tosi 
et al., 2000). Considering intrinsic motivation (in the case of family CEOs) as a factor might 
help to explain why firm performance is found to account for only a small portion of the 
variance in CEO pay (Tosi et al., 2000). Family management and the degree of family 
ownership might actually be an important moderator variable for this literature (see also 
McConaughy, 2000). Previous literature on executive pay in family firms has been mainly 
about a comparison of the absolute level of executive pay and its determinants (e.g., Gomez-
Meija et al., 2003). To the author’s best knowledge, this study is the first that analyses in 
detail the relationship between family firm attributes and the structure of executive pay. 
Finally, this paper contributes to the discussion of how the use of Bayesian methods 
can provide additional insights for management research (Hahn and Doh, 2006). In this paper,   17
the comparison of the results from the Bayesian and the classical approach allowed the author 
to be very cautious about the results. Only the findings confirmed by both types of models 
were considered to be robust. In this way, the Bayesian approach is a useful robustness check. 
I believe that such a robustness check could be a useful additional tool in many empirical 
studies in management science, in particular in cases where the dataset is small and it is 
difficult to obtain precise estimates. 
Generalizability 
This paper analyzes a topic that, so far, has received little attention. As usual, in the 
interpretation of the results, some limitations apply. The generalization of our results is 
limited in that we regard only large public U.S. firms.
8 Small to medium-sized firms, as well 
as private firms, are not part of our sample. It would be interesting to see if the paper’s results 
also hold for a sample of private or small to medium-sized family firms. An argument in 
support of this view is that financial market pressures should be lower for these types of firms 
compared to this paper’s sample of large publicly listed family firms. 
Conclusion 
Turning back to the question of whether CEOs in family firms are paid like bureaucrats, the 
evidence presented in this paper provides a mixed picture. On the one hand, it is found that 
family management and the degree of family ownership increase the share of base salary in 
total pay. Furthermore, it is found that family management decreases the level of stock option 
pay. Thus, the idea that CEOs in family firms are paid more like bureaucrats is supported. On 
the other hand, the share of incentive pay in family firms is still very high. For example, the 
mean share of stock-option pay of a family CEO is about 44%. The mean share of annual 
bonus of a family CEO is about 19%. In conclusion, the link between pay and performance 
                                                 
8   For a study on executive pay in small to medium-sized family firms, see Schulze et al. (2003).   18
seems to be less strong in family firms than in non-family firms. Nevertheless, a large amount 
of pay is still dependent on performance. The discussion of the structure of executive pay and 
the exorbitant value of stock option pay in the media and the academic literature should take 
into account differences between family and non-family firms. 
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Tables to be inserted in the text: 
 















  Level of executive compensation  
(in million $) 
 
  Structure of executive compensation  
(share in %) 
Components of executive pay  Mean  Median  Min.  Max.  Std. dev.    Mean  Median  Min.  Max.  Std. dev. 
Base salary  0.79  0.78  0  3.65  0.37    24%  18%  0%  100%  21% 
Annual bonus  0.99  0.66  0  16.50  1.35    19%  17%  0%  100%  17% 
Long-term incentive plan  0.33  0  0  29.25  1.42    4%  0%  0%  82%  11% 
Stock pay  0.69  0  0  66.99  2.88    6%  0%  0%  94%  15% 
Stock option pay  5.22  1.78  0  290.59  14.32    44%  44%  0%  99%  31% 
Miscellaneous other compensation 
a 0.21  0  0 96.33  2.10   3%  0%  0%  100%  9% 
Total pay  8.22  4.41  <0.01  293.10  15.52     
 
N=2,578 obs. from 393 firms; Std. dev. = Standard deviation 
a Miscellaneous other compensation includes the ExecuComp data items ALLOTHPD (all other paid) and OTHANN (other annual).   23 
 
Table 1b: Structure of executive pay: family versus non-family firms 
 
  Family versus non-family CEOs    Family owns more than 5%? 
 



























































































N=2,578; Std. dev. = Standard deviation; p-values refer to a two sided t-test. 
a Miscellaneous other compensation includes the ExecuComp data items ALLOTHPD (all other paid) and OTHANN (other annual).   24
 
 Table 2: Random effects regression on total pay 
   Total compensation 
 (in $000s) 
Variables     ß (SE)   
        
Family CEO     512.81 (988.19)     
Ownership by family    -58.21 (31.34)  *   
Ownership by financial investors    -49.07 (19.34)  **   
Ownership by employees    -8.81 (83.47)     
Firm size     3,835.41 (580.89)  ***  
Firm age    -603.29 (669.66)     
Sales growth in last 5 years    -32.89 (19.04)  *   
Leverage     92.84 (30.84)  ***  
Change in PPE/ 100     33.51 (36.61)     
Risk diversified     198.74 (247.37)     
Risk undiversified     22.20 (8.51)  ***  
Market-to-book ratio     868.50 (517.20)  *   
ROA     15.18 (28.55)     
CEO’s tenure    -71.31 (19.82)  ***  
CEO duality     1,443.24 (695.97)  **   
Industry dummies (54 categories)     p<0.001     
Time dummies (9 categories)     p<0.001     
        
N obs. (firms)     2,578 (393)   
Obs. per group: min./avg./max.     1/6.6/10   
p-value Chi²-test     p<0.001   
Rho (fraction of variance due to ui)     0.23   
Breusch-pagan test     p<0.001   
R² within, R² between, R² overall     0.10   0.39   0.21   
      
 
* p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 
Standard errors (SE) are robust and clustered; Two-sided tests are used.   25 
Table 3: Random effects regressions on the level and structure of executive pay (1) 
 
   Base salary 
 (level in $000s) 
 Base salary 
 (share in %) 
 
 Annual bonus 
 (level in $000s) 
 Annual bonus 
 (share in %) 
 Long-term incentive 
 plan (level in $000s) 
 Long-term incentive 
 plan (share in %) 
Variables     ß (SE)     ß (SE)     ß (SE)     ß (SE)     ß (SE)     ß (SE)   
                                   
Family CEO    -95.26 (32.28) ***     3.94 (1.97)  **    -89.52 (80.69)       0.20 (1.35)       102.18 (117.63)      -0.58 (0.90)     
Ownership by family    -1.10 (1.31)       0.24 (0.08)  ***    -1.99 (5.48)       0.07 (0.05)      -9.93 (5.53)  *    -0.02 (0.02)     
Ownership by financial investors     0.43 (0.61)      -0.05 (0.04)      4.39 (2.83)       0.03 (0.03)       1.62 (2.54)       0.04 (0.02)  **   
Ownership by employees    -0.97 (2.53)      -0.08 (0.13)      12.02 (10.93)       0.08 (0.09)       4.46 (11.46)       0.02 (0.10)     
Firm size     98.96 (17.85) ***    -2.62 (0.79) ***     341.65 (68.61)***    -0.87 (0.54)       107.23 (51.06)  **     0.70 (0.32)  **   
Firm age     30.00 (21.89)      0.65 (1.30)       26.99 (48.30)       0.56 (0.75)       114.21 (58.56)  *     1.50 (0.54)  ***   
Sales growth in last 5 years     0.23 (0.27)       0.03 (0.03)      -0.74 (0.91)       0.00 (0.02)       1.45 (0.96)       0.00 (0.00)     
Leverage    -0.70 (0.81)       0.06 (0.04)      -5.15 (3.52)       0.03 (0.04)      -5.43 (3.77)      -0.01 (0.02)     
Change in PPE/ 100     0.22 (0.33)      -0.02 (0.02)      3.36 (1.54)  **     0.01 (0.02)       11.57 (7.11)       0.03 (0.02)     
Risk diversified    -3.32 (6.59)      -0.09 (0.37)      26.78 (26.28)       0.20 (0.28)       19.51 (42.32)       0.03 (0.02)     
Risk undiversified    -0.20 (0.11)  *    -0.00 (0.01)     -0.15 (0.27)      -0.01 (0.00)  ***     0.31 (0.40)      -0.00 (0.00)     
Market-to-book ratio     1.14 (1.74)      -0.78 (0.26) ***     25.63 (14.57)  *    -0.21 (0.12)  *     10.53 (10.89)       0.03 (0.04)     
ROA     0.62 (0.49)       0.01 (0.03)       5.40 (3.00)  *     0.11 (0.06)  *     2.18 (2.17)       0.01 (0.01)     
CEO’s tenure     3.06 (0.73)  ***     0.18 (0.04)  ***     0.41 (2.53)       0.05 (0.03)       1.27 (2.12)       0.03 (0.03)     
CEO duality     58.66 (15.70) ***    -0.46 (1.21)      80.23 (56.72)       1.05 (0.99)       19.46 (104.28)       0.18 (0.69)     
Industry dummies (54 categories)     p<0.001       p<0.001       p<0.001       p<0.001       p<0.001       p<0.001     
Time dummies (9 categories)     p<0.001       p<0.001       p<0.001       p<0.001       p<0.001       p<0.001     
                                   
N obs. (firms)     2,578 (393)     2,578 (393)     2,578 (393)     2,578 (393)     2,578 (393)     2,578 (393)   
Obs. per group: min./avg./max.     1/6.6/10     1/6.6/10     1/6.6/10     1/6.6/10     1/6.6/10     1/6.6/10   
p-value Chi²-test     p<0.001     p<0.001     p<0.001     p<0.001     p<0.001     p<0.001   
Rho (fraction of variance due to ui)     0.58     0.33     0.36     0.19     0.37     0.38   
Breusch-pagan test     p<0.001     p<0.001     p<0.001     p<0.001     p<0.001     p<0.001   
R² within, R² between, R² overall     0.20   0.47   0.40     0.12   0.28   0.19     0.07   0.46   0.37     0.07   0.30   0.17     0.03   0.11   0.07     0.01   0.19   0.11   
                       
 
* p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01; Standard errors (SE) are robust and clustered; Two-sided tests are used. 
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Table 3: Random effects regressions on the level and structure of executive pay (2) 
 
   Stock pay 
 (level in $000s) 
 Stock pay 
 (share in %) 
 
 Stock option pay 
 (level in $000s) 
 Stock option pay 
 (share in %) 
Variables     ß (SE)     ß (SE)     ß (SE)     ß (SE)   
                        
Family CEO    -14.78 (198.18)      -0.39 (1.12)      706.96 (952.90)      -4.61 (2.42)  *   
Ownership by family    -11.71 (6.85)  *    -0.07 (0.04) *    -32.54 (27.82)      -0.24 (0.08)  ***   
Ownership by financial investors    -0.50 (4.15)       0.04 (0.03)      -54.36 (17.86)  ***    -0.07 (0.06)     
Ownership by employees    -22.82 (22.21)       0.13 (0.10)       0.65 (67.26)      -0.16 (0.14)     
Firm size     270.16 (93.06)  ***    0.21 (0.48)       2,755.13 (562.64) ***     2.35 (1.03)  ***   
Firm age     84.02 (101.79)       1.99 (0.76)  ***    -976.21 (640.70)       -5.29 (1.58)  ***   
Sales growth in last 5 years     2.04 (1.88)      -0.00 (0.01)     -33.18 (18.47)  *    -0.01 (0.05)     
Leverage    -5.71  (6.10)       0.04  (0.03)     -76.14  (28.83)  ***  -0.10  (0.06)  *   
Change in PPE/ 100    -7.23 (7.84)      -0.02 (0.02)      40.33 (34.19)       0.04 (0.04)     
Risk diversified     2.25 (33.70)      -0.03 (0.20)      165.56 (242.60)      -0.06 (0.51)     
Risk undiversified     0.50 (0.52)       0.00 (0.00)       20.84 (8.39)  **     0.02 (0.01)  **   
Market-to-book ratio     22.08 (23.22)       0.10 (0.07)       810.29 (485.56)  *     0.90 (0.33)  ***   
ROA     6.14 (3.72)  *     0.01 (0.01)       0.36 (24.37)      -0.12 (0.06)  **   
CEO’s  tenure    -9.39  (5.17)  *   -0.06  (0.04) *   -58.65  (17.59)  ***  -0.17  (0.06)  ***   
CEO duality     210.67 (127.28) *     0.35 (0.89)       1,008.85 (661.45)      0.72 (1.75)     
Industry dummies (54 categories)     p<0.001       p<0.001       p<0.001       p<0.001     
Time dummies (9 categories)     p<0.001       p<0.001       p<0.001       p<0.001     
                        
N obs. (firms)     2,578 (393)     2,578 (393)     2,578 (393)     2,578 (393)   
Obs. per group: min./avg./max.     1/6.6/10     1/6.6/10     1/6.6/10     1/6.6/10   
p-value Chi²-test     p<0.001     p<0.001     p<0.001     p<0.001   
Rho (fraction of variance due to ui)     0.27     0.28     0.22     0.28   
Breusch-pagan test     p<0.001     p<0.001     p<0.001     p<0.001   
R² within, R² between, R² overall     0.02   0.41   0.16     0.02   0.41   0.17     0.08   0.36   0.18     0.12   0.33   0.21   
                
 
* p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01; Standard errors (SE) are robust and clustered; Two-sided tests are used. 
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Table 4: Random effects Bayesian regressions on the structure of executive pay 
a 
 
  Base salary 
(share in %) 
 
Annual bonus 
(share in %) 
Long-term incentive plan 
(share in %) 
Stock pay 
(share in %) 
Stock option pay 





























                   
                   
Family CEO  3.88 99% 2.10 91% -0.01 50% 0.88  74% -10.07  <1%
Ownership by family  0.10 83% -0.03 38% -0.03 30% -0.08  15% 0.01  52%
Ownership by financial investors  -0.03 28% 0.03 82% 0.04 96% 0.04  87% -0.10  7%
Ownership by employees  -0.38 2% -0.13 23% -0.17 5% 0.41 100% 0.31  86%
Firm size  -1.76 6% -3.26 <1% 0.47 79% -1.40  5% 5.50  100%
Firm  age  -4.09 19% 2.32 71% 1.12 67% 3.86 83% -2.04 38%
Sales growth in last 5 years  0.03 96% 0.01 62% 0.01 71% 0.00  60% -0.03  16%
Leverage 0.12 100% -0.01 44% -0.02 23% 0.03  81% -0.11  6%
Change in PPE  -0.02 16% 0.02 81% 0.03 99% -0.01 35% 0.02 66%
Risk diversified  22.01 82% 19.91 84% 11.96 83% 16.95 83% 32.87  82%
Risk  undiversified  -0.19 1% -0.16 1% -0.10 1% -0.13 3% -0.22 6%
Market-to-book ratio  -0.70 <1% -0.22 6% 0.05 71% 0.08  75% 0.80  100%
ROA 0.02 71% 0.09 100% 0.01 81% 0.01  69% -0.12  <1%
CEO’s tenure  0.23 100% 0.04 87% 0.04 96% -0.06  3% -0.25  <1%
CEO  duality  0.23 58% -0.82 21% 0.26 66% -0.34 35% 0.72 66%
Industry dummies (54 cat.)  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
Time dummies (9 cat.)  Included  Included  Included  Included  Included 
                  
                 
  .       
N obs. (firms)   2,578 (393)  2,578 (393)  2,578 (393)  2,578 (393)  2,578 (393) 
 
 
a   We use normally distributed priors with of mean of zero and a standard deviation of one.  
The use of alternative priors, however, does not change the results in a substantial way. 
   28
APPENDIX 
 
Table A1: Description of variables 
 
Variables Description   
  
Dependent variables   
Share of base salary (in %)  The dollar value of the base salary earned by the CEO during the 
fiscal year (ExecuComp data item SALARY) divided by total pay. 
Share of annual bonus (in %) 
The dollar value of a bonus (cash and non-cash) earned by the named 
executive officer during the fiscal year (ExecuComp data item 
BONUS) divided by total pay. 
Share of long-term incentive plan (in %) 
This is the amount paid out to the executive under the company's 
long-term incentive plan. These plans measure company performance 
over a period of more than one year (generally three years) 
(ExecuComp data item LTIP) divided by total pay. 
Share of stock pay (in %) 
The value of restricted stock granted during the year (determined as 
of the date of the grant) (ExecuComp data item RSTKGRNT) 
divided by total pay. 
Share of stock option pay (in %) 
The aggregate value of stock options granted to the executive during 
the year as valued using S&P's Black Scholes methodology 
(ExecuComp data item BLK_VALU) divided by total pay. 
Total pay 
The sum of the ExecuComp data items SALARY, BONUS, LTIP, 
RSTKGRNT, BLK_VALU, ALLOTHPD (all other paid), and 
OTHANN (other annual) divided by total pay. 
   
Independent variables   
Family CEO  Dummy=1 if CEO is from family. 
Ownership by family  Percentage of stock owned by family  
Ownership by financial investors  Percentage of stock owned by financial institutions (large banks, 
insurance companies, investment funds, etc.) 
Ownership by employees  Percentage of stock owned by employees 
Firm size  Log (total assets) 
Firm age  Log (number of years since the firm was founded) 
Sales growth in last 5 years  5-year least squares annual growth rate of sales 
Leverage  Long-term debt divided by total assets 
Change in (PPE)  Change in property, plant, and equipment (PPE)  
(that is, PPE t – PPE t-1 (in mn $) 
Risk diversified 
Part of the variance in the firm’s returns that is explained by changes 
in the market (that is, firm beta multiplied by variance in market 
returns). 
Risk undiversified 
Part of the variance in the firm’s returns that is not explained by 
changens in the market (that is, variance in the firm’s returns minus 
diversified risk).  
Market-to-book ratio  Sum of market value of equity and book value of debt divided by 
book value of total assets 
ROA  Return on assets 
CEO’s tenure  Number of years the individual has served as CEO 
CEO duality  Dummy=1 if CEO is also chairman of the board of directors. 
Industry dummies  2-digit SIC codes indicating industry membership 
(55 different industries)  
Time dummies  10 dummy variables indicating year of observation (1993-2002) 
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Table A2: Summary statistics and correlations 
 
 
  Variables   Mean  Std. 
 Dev. 













  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10  11  12  13  14   
1     Family CEO 
    0.27    0.45    0    1                1.30 
2     Ownership by family 
 
   5.48   12.66   0   88.8   0.25                           1.17 
3     Ownership by financial investors 
    13.44    11.56    0    86.2  -0.09 -0.24             1.19 
4     Ownership by employees
 
    1.89    5.04    0    40.2  -0.14 -0.06 -0.20            1.14 
5     Firm size 
b 
    8.54    1.33    3.61    13.24 -0.15 -0.08 -0.18 -0.11            1.56 
6     Firm age 
b 
   3.94   0.86   0   5.35  -0.30 -0.07 -0.08  0.22   0.35                    1.77 
7     Sales growth in last 5 years
 
   18.08   34.75  -25.6   743.22   0.15  0.14   0.02  -0.09 -0.15 -0.43                 1.57 
8     Leverage
 
   24.04   17.03   0   95.37  -0.15 -0.11  0.02   0.18   0.36   0.28  -0.12               1.31 
9     Change in PPE/ 100
 
   4.04   16.02  -119.06   428.66  -0.02  0.01  -0.07  0.02   0.26   0.01   0.05   0.07              1.09 
10   Risk diversified
 
   4.03   2.53   0   14.26   0.08  0.05  -0.07  0.01   0.11  -0.10  0.09  -0.15  0.03            1.12 
11   Risk undiversified
 
   157.54 183.83   0   2,349.81   0.19  0.03   0.11  -0.13 -0.28 -0.50  0.42  -0.22 -0.03  0.15          1.52 
12   Market-to-book ratio
 
   2.25   2.94   0.07   77.49   0.10  0.10   0.00  -0.11 -0.31 -0.32  0.44  -0.28 -0.03  0.11   0.28        1.48 
13   ROA
 
   5.41   14.24  -458.31   54.76  -0.01  0.03  -0.01 -0.01 -0.14  0.02  -0.09 -0.09  0.01   0.01  -0.08  0.20      1.12 
14   CEO’s tenure
 
   15.81   13.00   0    50   0.20  0.06  -0.08 -0.04  0.10   0.18  -0.11 -0.06  0.02   0.10  -0.11 -0.06  0.06    1.18 
15   CEO duality 
   0.79   0.41   0   1   0.11 -0.10  0.04   0.04   0.06   0.14  -0.12  0.05  -0.05 -0.02  0.06  -0.12  0.05   0.18  1.10 
                         
 
a  VIF=variance inflation factor  
b Logarithmized 
Correlations with an absolute value greater than 0.034 have a p-value below 0.1. Correlations with an absolute value greater than 0.04 have a p-value below 0.05.  
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